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Marko Novak 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE – FROM A “DEFERENT” TO A “NOVICE” JUDGE: 
Comments on Lorenzo Zoppellari's paper entitled “The acquisition of scientific evidence 
between Frye and Duabert. From ad hominem arguments to cross-examination among 
experts” 
I.  
In this very interesting paper, the author deals with the relation between law and science or, 
more specifically, about the role of scientific evidence in courts. He discusses the problem of 
that relation by primarily considering two issues. First, he looks at the general attitude of judges 
towards such evidence and, secondly, the argumentative strategies followed by parties to a 
dispute when they are confronted with expert testimony based on scientific evidence and which 
favors the opposing party.  
The author describes the evolution of judges’ attitudes towards scientific evidence through two 
American cases, the 1923 Frye and the 1993 Daubert rulings. It transpires that, in the first part 
of 20th century, judges tended to act in a subordinated, “passive” way with respect to expert 
knowledge in the sense of deferring to the official (i.e. “neutral” or “universally” valid) 
knowledge of the scientific community. It is perhaps no wonder that, in a world apparently 
ruled by “objective” science, judges never questioned scientific theories, but were more or less 
alert to ad hominem arguments if the parties attacked the reliability of the expert.  
The author highlights an epistemic change after WW2, especially from the 1960’s onwards, 
where the objectivity of scientific theories began to be questioned. This period saw the 
questioning of human rationality as such (Horkeimer, 1947), the scientific paradigm shifted 
(Kuhn, 1962), and the objectivity of science turned to be based on falsification theory (Popper, 
1959). The official authorities in society, including scientists and experts, were no longer taken 
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for granted. Ubi societas ibi ius and, accordingly, all these social changes were reflected in the 
modern social role of law and courts. The law has increasingly assumed a social role that had 
been once left to other social systems of value, such as religion, morality, tradition, customs, 
but also science. The crises of various parallel social norms, as well as scientific norms, was 
reflected in courts which became the last resort for resolving all sorts of social disputes. This 
seems to be an important reason why judges, through various procedural rules, were pushed 
into the position of being more active concerning expert testimonies. Even so, judges cannot 
replace requisite scientific knowledge with respect to scientific evidence.  
Consequently, the Daubert judgement, which merely reflects the Zeitgeist, saw judges being 
forced to become “gatekeepers” by evaluating scientific theories. This is not what judges 
themselves would want, but what they necessarily do since they must come to a decision that 
is not only lawful but also legitimate and by following the proper procedural steps (Luhmann, 
1969). These procedural steps not only allow parties, but sometimes even judges in inquisitorial 
criminal systems, to propose that certain scientific evidence be considered and which they freely 
evaluate at the end.  
 
II. 
Regarding my comments on the paper itself, I would begin from its very last idea that the 
examination and cross-examination of experts could even be improved by “allowing experts to 
examine each other”, which is otherwise prohibited by the Italian and American legal systems. 
As a matter of fact, the idea seems to be interesting as it would definitely improve the epistemic 
value of scientific evidence, making judges’ decisions easier and better, and benefiting parties 
to disputes and society in general. In fact, this is the case in Slovenia where, according to Art. 
334.1 of the Criminal Procedure Act, also “[t]he injured party, legal representative, attorney 
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and expert may put direct questions to witnesses and experts subject to approval from the 
presiding judge.” This is pursuant of the principle of material truth, according to Art. 17 of that 
Act, providing that “[t]he court and state bodies participating in criminal procedure shall 
establish completely and according to the truth the facts relevant for passing a lawful decision.” 
If this is allowed in the criminal procedures of a more inquisitorial framework, it is not the case 
in civil proceedings with a more adversarial framework. 
However, I understand the procedural reservation with respect to experts examining other 
experts, since the courtroom should not be an offshoot of a university or academy (i.e. scientific 
community) where different theories are debated. What is typical for such is a certain kind of 
procedural discipline. If such reservation does not seem to be justified from an epistemic point 
of view, it seems to be from a dialectical argumentative aspect. Dialectically speaking, in 
adversarial proceedings we have two parties (a protagonist and an antagonist) who confront 
their positions with the goal of winning the case. For that reason, they often resort to eristic 
techniques and try to find experts who would support their position. If such experts are allowed 
to examine other experts, there is a risk that they would jeopardize the epistemic value of their 
testimony by subordinating it to its argumentative value. In inquisitorial criminal proceedings, 
the judge might choose to nominate his or her own expert who does not have an eristic 
imperative on his or her shoulders. Only in this sense, and thus one which is tailored quite 
narrowly, could I envisage experts examining other experts following the presiding judge’s 
approval. 
There could also be another point, apart from the idea that experts should participate in cross-
examination. Given the modern loss of scientific “objectivity” and the transfer of university 
debates to courtrooms, the epistemic frustration of judges might be alleviated by other manners. 
Judges could find some degree of consolation in various standards of proof: e. g., if scientific 
evidence is not clear, or there are different views with none prevailing, in criminal proceedings 
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the standard of beyond reasonable doubt could be used, while in civil proceedings the standard 
of the preponderance of evidence might be employed, etc. Moreover, in the criminal context, 
there are a number of principles, such as presumption of innocence, in dubio pro reo, etc., which 
can help the judge with the said epistemic frustration.     
Finally, I have a few suggestions as to how the text’s coherence might be improved. First, the 
author did not want to bother the reader with the facts and specific argumentation strategies in 
the two cases discussed, Frye and Daubert. However, in order to follow the line of 
argumentation closely, it would benefit from at least a short summary of what the case was 
about, which scientific evidence was employed, what were the specific argumentation strategies 
of the parties to the cases (with respect to ad hominem attacks and cross-examination of the 
experts), and how the judges reacted and eventually decided the case. I do not want to convey 
the impression that the theoretical analysis of the two approaches is not important or interesting 
in itself, but it loses the requisite practical exactness without some kind of factual background. 
Second, since Douglas Walton is mentioned with respect to the ad hominem argument used to 
attack the experts in the old Frye framework, it might be useful to add Saunders’ views that, 
although ad hominem arguments are generally fallacious, they are not such in the context of 
law. He believes that they can be used here,1 as in the Frye case, to attack the credibility of an 
expert. Whilst mentioning Walton, it would also be useful to discuss his argument from expert 
opinion (Walton, Reed, Macagno, 2008: 310), where what is particularly interesting are his 
critical questions relating to expertise, field, opinion, trustworthiness, consistency, and back 
evidence. In this respect, one might be able to determine the kind of evolution that has occurred 
from Frye to Daubert, and, perhaps, any additional critical questions that could be posed. 
 
1 “… considerations that are irrelevant and perhaps even misleading in areas of purely rational discourse, such a 
philosophy, may be relevant and enlightening in law. With its mixture of rational debate of legal issues, inquiry 
into factual issues, and concern with demands of justice, law may tolerate a wider variety of arguments.” (Saunders, 
1993: 345). 
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Last, but not least, the author might also like to add a rhetorical point. Whilst Goldman’s 
expert/novice metaphor is said to apply to Duabert, this epistemic relationship between the 
judge and the expert could be juxtaposed with the situation in Frye, where another metaphor 
can be discerned. Perhaps this could be framed as the expert and the lay person? By introducing 
the rhetorical figure of antitheses (Garner, 2002: 160), I believe that the contrast between the 
two metaphors would make the first even stronger and more persuasive.   
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